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I. Introduction
Recently, there has been a fair amount of activity in the oil and gas
industry that impacts sovereign lands. There has been one important
amendment to existing federal regulations and two minor amendments. In
addition to the amendments, there has been several new decisions issued by
federal circuit and appellate courts regarding operations on tribal lands that
will undoubtably have an impact regarding oil and gas development.

* Brent D. Chicken is a member in the Denver, Colorado, office of Steptoe & Johnson
PLLC. He is licensed in Colorado, Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, and Utah, and
focuses his practice in oil and gas law. Amanda J. Dick is an associate in the Denver,
Colorado, office of Steptoe & Johnson PLLC. She is licensed in Colorado and focuses her
practice in energy transactions and litigation.
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II. Federal Regulatory Developments
A. Amendments
There were several amendments made to existing federal regulations that
impact the oil and gas industry. Most relevant to sovereign lands is the
amendment to 25 C.F.R. § 224.30 “What Definitions Apply to This Part?”
The following substantial changes were made to the Indian Tribal Energy
Development and Self-Determination Act (“Act”) in the December 18,
2019, amendment.
The term “Qualified Tribe” was added and defined as: “a Tribe with
Tribal lands that has - (1) For a period of not less than 3 consecutive years
ending on the date on which the Tribe submits the application, carried out a
contract or compact relating to the management of Tribal land or natural
resources under title I or IV of the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 5301 et seq.) without material audit exception
(or without any material audit exceptions that were not corrected within the
3-year period); or (2) Substantial experience in the administration, review,
or evaluation of energy resource leases or agreements or has otherwise
substantially participated in the administration, management, or
development of energy resources located on the Tribal land of the Indian
Tribe.”1
Further, the definition of “Tribal energy development organization” or
“TEDO” was added and defined as: “(1) Any enterprise, partnership,
consortium, corporation, or other type of business organization that is
engaged in the development of energy resources and is wholly owned by a
Tribe, including but not limited to an organization incorporated under
section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 5124 or section 3
of the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, 49 Stat, 1967, chapter 831; and (2)
Any organization of two or more entities, at least one of which is a Tribe,
that has the written consent of the governing bodies of all Tribes
participating in the organization, to apply for a grant, loan, or other
assistance under 25 U.S.C. § 3502 or to enter into a lease or business
agreement with, or acquire a right-of-way from, a Tribe under 25 U.S.C. §
3504(a) (2)(A)(ii) or (b)(2)(b).”2 Throughout the section, “Tribe” and
“Tribal” were edited to be capitalized and distinguished as defined terms.
The definition of “Tribe” now includes a reference to a list of federallyrecognized Tribes—published by the Secretary of the United States
1. 25 C.F.R. § 224.30.
2. Id.
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Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs—as evidence of Tribal
status.3
There were also two additional regulations updated as of February 19,
2020, which increased penalty amounts for violations when leasing on
Tribal lands. Under 25 C.F.R. § 211.55, the penalty for violations of the
terms and conditions of any lease or regulations in Part 211 was raised from
$1,597 per day to $1,626 per day, for each violation. Similarly, under 25
C.F.R. § 226.42, the penalty amount for violations of the terms and
conditions of any lease or regulation dealing with Osage Reservation lands
was increased from $948 to $965 per day, for each violation.
B. New Rules
New rules and guidance have also been issued by the United States
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”),
specifically regarding lease suspension and royalty rate reductions, in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. As of the date of this update, BLM’s
revised policy currently provides for 60-day temporary royalty rate relief
and 60-day lease suspension under specific situations. However, these rules
and guidance are continually changing as the COVID-19 pandemic evolves.
Operators and other industry professionals should continue to stay up to
date on industry impacts associated with the COVID-19 pandemic.
III. Judicial Developments
A. Process and Procedure Under the APA
1. Western Watersheds Project v. Zinke
The first impactful decision was Western Watersheds Project v. Zinke. 4
The beginning of this case traces back a few years to 2018, when BLM
altered its procedures for leasing oil and gas rights on certain federal lands. 5
BLM implemented these changes through an Instruction Memorandum
(“IM”), which supplied new instructions to the agency’s offices about how
to handle oil and gas leases.6 The changes made in the IM limited public

3. Id.
4. 441 F. Supp. 3d 1042 (D. Idaho 2020), reconsideration denied, stay granted, No.
1:18-CV-00187-REB, 2020 WL 2462817 (D. Idaho May 12, 2020).
5. Id. at 1049.
6. Id.
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participation in BLM oil and gas lease decisions, to promote and expedite
the process on public lands.7
Plaintiffs, Western Watersheds Project and Center for Biological
Diversity, sued the Secretary of the Interior, alleging that the changes in the
IM limited public participation in oil and gas lease decisions that affect and
threaten sage-grouse populations and other habitats.8 In 2018, the court
issued a preliminary injunction against the implementation of the IM in
regards to oil and gas lease sales in areas designated sage-grouse habitat
management areas.9 The Plaintiffs argued that the IM was both
procedurally and substantively invalid under the federal Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(“FLPMA”).10 Plaintiffs also argued that the issuance of the IM was
arbitrary and capricious under the APA.11
In the court’s analysis of the IM, they determined that the same was a
final agency action under the APA and the FLPMA, because it was much
more than a general statement of policy, but rather it implemented a
required template for BLM’s leasing process. 12 It contained significant
substantive and procedural changes in BLM practices that directly impacted
the rights and abilities of citizens and conservation organizations to
participate in or challenge leasing practices and decisions. 13 Rooted in their
finding that the IM constituted final agency action, the court held that the
IM was procedurally invalid because it had not been made subject to a
public notice-and-comment period.14 The court also found the IM to be
substantively invalid because it removed the public involvement element,
required under both the APA and the FLPMA for implementing plans and
programs. 15
With the determination that the IM was both procedurally and
substantively invalid, the court’s subsequent conclusion that BLM’s
issuance of the IM was arbitrary and capricious was not a surprise.
Specifically, the court held that in implementing changes to jettison the
leasing of oil and gas rights on federal and tribal lands—in favor of
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1050.
Id.
Id. at 1060.
Id.
Id. at 1067.
Id. at 1069.
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economic maximization, and to the detriment of public input, all without
the proper procedure—was arbitrary and capricious.16 The court vacated the
provisions of the IM with respect to the leases that affected sage-grouse
populations and habitats, and it vacated prior lease sales conducted pursuant
to the IM with respect to leases that affected sage-grouse populations and
habitats.17 The provisions of the IM that were vacated by the court and
replaced with the previous 2010 version; sales and procedures were to
continue under the 2010 standards until BLM issued a new IM in
compliance with all processes and procedures under the APA and
FLPMA.18
2. California v. Bernhardt
The procedural posture and outcome in California v. Bernhardt19 are
very similar to those seen in Western Watersheds.20 In Bernhardt,
California, New Mexico, and several environmental advocacy organizations
sued BLM regarding a rulemaking process that altered oil and gas
operations.21 Specifically, BLM’s regulatory scheme governing the
minimization of resource waste had not been updated in over 30 years. In
2016, BLM issued a proposed rule to update the regulations and the
proposed rule received over 330,000 public comments.22 The final rule was
issued seven months later, in 2017, after several meetings, revisions, and
significant public input.23 The 2016 rule was designed to attain considerable
reductions in waste from flaring, venting, and equipment malfunctions.
These reductions were aimed at increasing federal and tribal royalties and
protecting the environment, with significant consideration for global
climate change impacts.24 Several lawsuits ensued shortly after issuance of
the rule by various states and industry groups, each attempting to get the
new rule “dropped.”25
In 2018, while those lawsuits were proceeding, BLM issued a new rule
rescinding the highly litigated and contested waste prevention rule that went
16. Id. at 1088.
17. Id. at 1089.
18. Id.
19. California v. Bernhardt, No. 4:18-CV-05712-YGR, 2020 WL 4001480 (N.D. Cal.
July 15, 2020).
20. See supra section i.
21. Bernhardt, No. 4:18-CV-05712-YGR, 2020 WL 4001480.
22. Id. at 3.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 4.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

330

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 6

into effect in 2017, i.e., the 2016 rule version. 26 The September 2018 rule
was discussed at length in last year’s publication, including the changes
made from the previous 2016 rule version. 27 The issuance of the 2018 rule
was accompanied by its fair share of controversy, triggering the Bernhardt
case.28
The court held, for several reasons, that the process of promulgating the
2018 rule was “wholly inadequate,” and warranted rescission of the subject
rule. 29 First, the court found that BLM ignored the federal Mineral Leasing
Act’s statutory mandate by adding an “economic limitation” to the
interpretation of “waste” and through a “blanket delegation” of state and
tribal authority.30
Second, the court found that BLM did not comply with the APA, finding
fault with all of BLM’s grounds: no adequate justification for reversing its
position that the requirements of the 2016 were “economical, cost-effective,
and reasonable”; impermissible reliance on President Trump’s Executive
Order 13783, in a manner that was inconsistent with statutory mandates;
arbitrary and capricious use of a new “interim domestic” social cost of
methane to analyze costs and benefits; arbitrary ignorance of the rule’s
benefits; arbitrary overstatement of the administrative burden, and failure to
explain the “dramatic recalculation” of administrative costs; and arbitrary
and capricious calculation of compliance costs. 31
Third, the court found that BLM did not satisfy its “hard look” obligation
under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) with respect to
impacts on public health (including impacts on tribal communities), impacts
on climate, and cumulative climate impacts of BLM’s fossil fuel program. 32
Lastly, the court found that BLM erred by not preparing an
environmental impact statement. Accordingly, the court stayed its vacatur
of the 2018 rule, and re-implemented the 2017 rule for 90 days to allow the
parties to determine next steps.33

26. Id. at 6.
27. See Brent D. Chicken, Amanda J. Dick, Sovereign Lands, 5 Oil & Gas, Nat.
Resources & Energy J. 273, 275 (2019).
28. No. 4:18-CV-05712-YGR, 2020 WL 4001480.
29. California v. Bernhardt, 2020 WL 4001480.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. At the time of the update the 90 days has not expired, and it is undetermined
what the next steps will be regarding the waste prevention rule.
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3. Solenex LLC v. Bernhardt
A third case—also involving the procedural process under the APA for
oil and gas leases on federal land—is Solenex LLC v. Bernhardt.34 Plaintiff
Solenex LLC (“Solenex”), instituted an action against the Secretary of the
Interior concerning a decision cancelling an oil and gas lease Solenex held
covering a portion of the Badger-Two Medicine Area (“Area”).35 In 2016,
the lease was cancelled because the Area’s unique cultural, religious,
spiritual, historical, and environmental significance were not properly
analyzed as required by NEPA and the National Historic Preservation Act
(“NHPA”) when the lease was initially issued 33 years earlier. 36
The district court ruled in favor of Solenex, holding that the amount of
time that had elapsed between the lease’s issuance and the cancellation of
the same violated the APA, and the agency failed to consider Solenex’s
reliance on the lease before the cancellation.37 The decision was appealed,
and the appellate court agreed with the federal agency, ultimately vacating
the district court’s judgment.38
The appellate court reasoned that delay by the Secretary of the Interior in
cancelling the oil and gas lease—33 years of delay to be exact—did not
alone render the decision arbitrary and capricious and in violation of the
APA, and there were no harmful consequences emanating from the delay
that were not reasonably taken into account by the agency. 39 The violations
of NEPA and NHPA during the initial issuance of the lease were discovered
by environmental studies done on the land prior to surface-disturbing
activity and issuance of drilling permits. Such environmental studies are
standard practice, Solenex was notified of the studies, advised that drilling
permit issuance was not guaranteed, and offered compensation for the
harmful consequences considered by the Secretary of the Interior.
Therefore, all harm was considered before cancelling the lease, the
cancellation was valid under the APA, and required by NEPA and NHPA. 40
The court reversed the lower decision, and held that a delay in cancelling
a federal lease does not alone render it in violation of the APA. 41 The court

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

962 F.3d 520 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
Id. at 522.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 529.
Id.at 530.
Id.
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also noted that this decision did not preclude the Plaintiff from raising a
breach of contract claim in federal claims court.
B. Pipelines on Tribal Lands
Two cases issued this year dealt with pipelines on or across tribal
lands—the Dakota Access Pipeline and the Keystone XL Pipeline.
In Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers,42 the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe (“SRS Tribe”) filed suit against
the United States Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”), to block their actions
related to the Dakota Access Pipeline. The SRS Tribe sought injunctive and
declaratory relief under NEPA, NHPA, the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), and
the Rivers and Harbors Act (“RHA”). Specifically, the SRS Tribe
challenged federal permits and authorizations issued to construct segments
of the Dakota Access Pipeline to carry crude oil under the Missouri River,
which was a federally regulated waterway bordering the SRS Tribe’s
reservation.43This case has been ongoing since 2016, but several important
rulings were made in 2020.
In March, the court granted partial summary judgment to the SRS Tribe,
ruling that the Corps had violated NEPA by determining that an
environmental impact statement was unnecessary, and it ordered the Corps
to complete such statement. 44 Additionally, the court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Corps on the SRS Tribes’ claims under NHPA. 45
In July, the court vacated the original easement granted to the Corps that
had initially authorized construction of the pipeline under the Missouri
River near the reservation.46 The court ordered the pipeline be closed and
emptied by August 5, 2020 and remain empty until the Corps completes the
environmental impact statement.47
In Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Trump,48 the Rosebud Sioux Tribe (“RS
Tribe”) brought suit against President Trump, in his official capacity, and
several governmental agencies (“Defendants”) seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against the permit issued for the cross-border Keystone XL
42. 440 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2020).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No. CV 16-1534
(JEB), 2020 WL 3634426 (D.D.C. July 6, 2020). This decision has been appealed, but as of
the update there had not been an decision issued on the appeal.
47. Id.
48. 428 F. Supp. 3d 282 (D. Mont. 2019).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss2/27

2020]

Sovereign Lands

333

Pipeline. The RS Tribe argued that Defendants violated various treaties, the
Foreign Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, and several
federal statutes and regulations. The RS Tribes’ also argued they inherented
sovereign powers when President Trump issued a presidential permit to an
energy company for the pipeline. 49
This case is still in its procedural beginnings. In December 2019, the
court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing and failure
to state a claim and held that the RS Tribe had standing and sufficiently
alleged all claims.50 Oral argument occurred in April 2020, though no ruling
has yet been issued.

49. Id.
50. Id.
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